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The Diversity of Bayesian Explanation
A Reply to Dominic L. Harkness
Jakob Hohwy
My claim is that, if we understand the function of the brain in terms of the free
energy principle, then the brain can explain the mind. Harkness discusses some
objections to this claim, and proposes a cautious way of solidifying the explanat-
ory potential of the free energy principle. In this response, I sketch a wide, di-
verse, and yet pleasingly Bayesian conception of scientific explanation. According
to this conception, the free energy principle is already richly explanatory.
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1 Introduction
The free energy principle free energy principle
(FEP) is ambitiously touted as a unified theory
of  the mind, which should be able to explain
everything  about  our  mental  states  and  pro-
cesses. Dominic L. Harkness discusses the route
from the  principle  to  actual  explanations.  He
reasonably argues that it is not immediately ob-
vious  how  explanations  of  actual  phenomena
can be extracted from the free energy principle,
and then offers positive suggestions for under-
standing FEP’s potential for fostering explana-
tions. The argument I focus on in Hohwy (this
collection) is that FEP is not so preposterous
that it cannot explain at all;  Harkness’s com-
mentary thus  raises  the important  point  that
there may be other obstacles to explanatoriness
than being preposterous.
A further aspect of Harkness’ approach is
to  make  contact  between  the  discussion  of
FEP’s  explanatory prowess  and discussions  in
philosophy of neuroscience about computational
and  mechanistic  explanation.  This  matters,
since, if FEP is really set to dominate the sci-
ences of the mind and the brain, then we need
to understand it from the point of view of philo-
sophy of science.
In  this  response,  I  will  attempt  to  blur
some distinctions between notions currently dis-
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cussed in the philosophy of science. This serves
to  show that  there  is  a  diversity  of  ways  in
which a theory, such as FEP, can be explanat-
ory. I am not, however, advocating explanatory
pluralism;  rather,  I  am  roughly  sketching  a
unitary Bayesian account of explanation accord-
ing to which good explanation requires balan-
cing the diverse ways in which evidence is ex-
plained away. This seems to me an attractive
approach to scientific explanation—not least be-
cause  it  involves  applying  FEP to  itself.  The
upshot is that even though FEP is not yet a full
explanation of the mind, there are several ways
in which it already now has impressive explan-
atory prowess.
2 Explanations, functions and 
mechanisms
Harkness  employs existing views in  the philo-
sophy  of  science  to  create  a  divide  between
functions  and  mechanisms:  functions  specify
what some phenomenon of interest ought to be
doing, they don’t specify how it actually does
it. For that, a mechanism is needed which, in
addition  to  specifying  a  functional  role,  also
names the parts of the mechanism that perform
this role (i.e., the realisers of the function), for
example in the brain. This is thought to limit
the  explanatory  power  of  FEP,  which  at  its
mathematical heart is just functionalist.
Whilst I accept the divide between func-
tions and realisers, I don’t think there is much
explanatory  mileage  in  naming  realisers.  If  I
already know what functional role is being real-
ized, I don’t come to understand a phenomenon
better by being given the names of the realizing
properties. This can be seen by imagining any
mechanistic  explanation  (encompassing  both
functional role and realisers) where the names
of  the  realizing  properties  are  exchanged  for
other names. Such a move might deprive us of
knowledge of  which parts of the world realize
this function, but this is not in itself explanat-
ory  knowledge.  For  example,  I  get  to  under-
stand the heart by being told the functional role
realized by atria and ventricles; I don’t lose un-
derstanding  if  we rename the  atria  “As”  and
ventricles “Bs”.
This is not to deny that we can gain un-
derstanding from learning about mechanisms.
In  particular,  if  I  don’t  know  about  a  phe-
nomenon of interest, then I might explore the
realizer of a particular case, and thereby get
clues about the functional role. For example,
in the 17th century William Harvey was able
to  finally  comprehensively  explain  the  func-
tional role of the heart by performing vivisec-
tion on animals. Indeed, the point of such an
exercise is to arrive at a clear and detailed de-
scription of a functional role (recall the differ-
ence between behaviourism and functionalism
is that for the latter, the functional role is not
just  an  input–output  profile  but  also  a  de-
scription of the internal states and transitions
between states). 
Importantly, exploration (e.g., via vivisec-
tion, or via functional magnetic resonance ima-
ging) of  a mechanism is not the only way to
eventually arrive at explanations. There can be
multiple  contexts  of  discovery.  In  particular,
there can be very broad empirical observations
as well as conceptual arguments. In the case of
FEP, a key observation is that living organisms
exist in this changing world. That is, organisms
like us are able to maintain themselves in a lim-
ited number  of  states.  This  immediately  puts
constraints  on  any  mechanistic  explanation,
which must cohere with this basic observation.
Further, since an organism cannot know a priori
what its expected states are, there must be an
element  of  uncertainty  reduction  going  on
within the organism in order to estimate its ex-
pected states, or model. In a world with state-
dependent  uncertainty,  this  must  happen
through  hierarchical  inference.  With  these
simple notions, FEP itself is well on its way to
being established.
So I don’t think it is  explanatory power
that is limited by being confined, as FEP fun-
damentally is, to functional roles. This mainly
seems to impose a limit  on our knowledge of
which objects realize a given functional role, or
it might curb our progress in finessing the func-
tional role in question. Whereas it is  right to
say that  FEP is  limited  because  it  is  merely
functional, this limit does not apply to its ex-
planatory prowess.
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3 Explanations and mechanism sketches
In assessing the explanatoriness of a functional
theory like FEP it is useful, as Harkness pro-
poses,  to  consider  it  as  a  mechanism  sketch.
Sketchiness, however, comes in degrees, and it is
hard to think of any extant scientific account
that is not sketchy in some respects—no matter
how abundantly mechanistic it is. There doesn’t
seem  to  be  any  principled  point  at  which  a
sketchy functional account passes over into be-
ing a non-sketchy mechanistic account. Rather,
an account may become less and less sketchy as
the full functional role and its realisers are in-
creasingly revealed. This would be one respect
in which the explanation in question would ex-
pand: more types and ranges of evidence would
be explained, accompanied by a richer  under-
standing of the functional workings of the mech-
anism.
The idea here is that mechanistic explana-
tion comes in degrees, which makes it hard to
say  clearly  when  something  is  a  mechanism
sketch. Speaking of organs, consider again the
case of the heart. Harvey is often said to have
provided the first full account of pulmonary cir-
culation, and it might be true that his account
is less sketchy than that of his precursors, such
as the much earlier Ibn al-Nafis. Yet even Har-
vey had areas of ignorance about the heart, and
had to deduce some parts of his theory from his
hypothesis  about  the  overall  function  of  the
heart. Indeed, he readily acknowledges the diffi-
culty of his project: 
When I first gave my mind to vivisections,
as a means of discovering the motions and
uses of the heart, and sought to discover
these from actual inspection, and not from
the writings of others, I found the task so
truly arduous, so full of difficulties, that I
was  almost  tempted  to  think,  with
Fracastorius, that the motion of the heart
was  only  to  be  comprehended  by  God.
(Harvey 1889, p. 20)
A key question then is how sketchy FEP is—is
it  more  like  Harvey’s  rather  comprehensive
sketch  of  the  heart,  or  is  it  like  that  of  al-
Nafis? (If it is not completely misguided, like
Galen’s claim that there are invisible channels
between  the  ventricles.)  Harkness  suggests
that part of the attraction of FEP is that it
comes with more empirical specification than
mere Bayesian theory. It is true that much of
the literature on FEP tries to map mathemat-
ical detail onto aspects of neurobiology. How-
ever, the mathematical detail of FEP itself is
devoid  of  particular  empirical  fact—it  is
purely functionalist. (We might even say FEP
is more fundamental than the Bayesian brain
hypothesis, since the latter seems to be deriv-
able from the former.)
However,  this  austerity  with  respect  to
specification of particular types of fact does not
make  FEP  inherently  sketchy.  The  starting
point for FEP is the trivial but contingent fact
that the world is a changing place and yet or-
ganisms exist—that is, that they can maintain
themselves in a limited set of fluctuating states.
This very quickly leads to the idea that organ-
isms  must  be  recapitulating  (modelling)  the
structure of the world, and that they must be
approximating  Bayesian  inference  in  their  at-
tempt to figure out what their expected states
are.
This starting point for FEP gives us a lot
of structure to look for in the brains of particu-
lar creatures. It calls for hierarchical structures
the levels of which can encode sufficient statist-
ics (means and variances) of probability distri-
butions, pass these as messages throughout the
system, and engage in explaining away and up-
dating  distributions  over  various  time-scales.
This has a much more mechanistic flavour than
a more pure appeal to Bayes’ rule, which leaves
many  more  questions  about  the  inferential
mechanistics of the brain unanswered. (Part of
the difference here is  that FEP suggests that
the brain implements approximate Bayesian in-
ference,  described  in  terms  of  variational
Bayes.) 
It  is  reasonable,  then,  to  say that,  even
when  stripped  of  extraneous  neurobiological
scaffolding,  FEP is  not  inherently  sketchy.  It
might  not  have  the  wealth  of  particular  fact
that would make it analogous to Harvey’s the-
ory of the heart. But it gives a surprisingly very
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rich description of the functional role implemen-
ted by the brain of living organisms.
4 Explanation and types of functionalism
One might still insist on the point that Hark-
ness raises, namely that, even if FEP is not par-
ticularly  sketchy  when  stripped  of  empirical
content, it is really only an account of what the
system should do, rather than what it  actually
does.  There  is  of  course  some  truth  to  this,
since the mathematical formulation of  FEP is
an  idealization  of  a  system  engaged  in  vari-
ational Bayes. 
However,  perhaps  FEP  is  in  a  peculiar
functionalist  category.  Its  starting  point,  as  I
mentioned earlier, is the trivial truth that or-
ganisms exist, from which it follows that they
must be acting to maintain themselves in a lim-
ited set of states, from which it in turn follows
that they must be reducing uncertainty about
their  model.  Thus  the  function  described  by
FEP is not about what the system should or
ought to be doing but about what it  must be
doing, given the contingent fact that it exists.
This starting point differs from common-
sense functionalism because it is not based on
conceptual analysis  but is  instead based on a
basic  observation,  plus  statistical  notions.  It
also  differs  from  empirical  functionalisms  (cf.
psychofunctionalism) because it does not specify
functional roles in terms of proximal input–out-
put profiles for particular creatures. Neither are
the functional roles it sets out defined in terms
of  teleologically-defined  proper  functions  (cf.
teleosemantics), except in so far as it could be
said that the proper function of an organism is
to exist.
This  category  of  functionalism,  which  I
dubbed “biofunctionalism”, seems intriguingly dif-
ferent  from  other  kinds  of  functionalism.  It
provides  a  foundational  functional  role,  which
must be realized in living organisms, and from
which more specific processes can be derived (for
perception,  action,  attention  etc.).  This  differs
from austere functionalisms, which only say how
things ought to be working, and it differs from
fully  mechanistic  functionalisms,  which  specify
how particular types of things actually work.
5 Explanation by unification, and by 
mechanism revelation
Explanation in science is not just a matter of
revealing the full  detail  of the parts and pro-
cesses  of  mechanisms.  Explanation  is  many
things,  as  evidenced  by  the  literature  on  the
topic in philosophy of science. Most commonly,
explanation is sought to reveal causes, and the
contemporary discussion of mechanisms contrib-
utes substantially to this discussion. A different
idea is that unification is explanatory—and yet
explanation by unification is a multifaceted and
disputed notion.
I  think  FEP explains  by  unification  be-
cause it is a principle that increases our under-
standing  of  many  very  different  phenomena,
such as illusions, social cognition, the self, de-
cision, movement, and so on (see The Predictive
Mind,  Hohwy 2013,  for  examples  and  discus-
sion). FEP teaches us something new and unex-
pected  about  these  phenomena,  namely  that
they are all related as different instances of pre-
diction-error minimization. For example, we are
surprised  to  learn  that  visual  attention  and
bodily movement are not only both engaged in
prediction  error  minimization,  they  are  essen-
tially identical phenomena. FEP thus explains
by providing a new, unified and coherent view
of the mind.
In this manner, FEP is explanatory partly
in ways that are separate from mechanistic ex-
planation, and also from the discussion of how
the functionalist and mechanistic approaches re-
late to each other.
6 Explanation is itself Bayesian
The comments I have provided so far appear to
pull somewhat in different directions. I have ar-
gued that there is no sharp delineation between
functional and mechanistic accounts, and yet I
acknowledged  that  the  functional  aspects  of
FEP do set it apart from fully mechanistic ac-
counts. I have argued that merely naming real-
isers  is  not  explanatory,  yet  I  have  acknow-
ledged that mechanistic accounts are explanat-
ory. I  have argued (with Harkness) that FEP
explains by guiding particular  mechanistic  ac-
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counts, but also by unification. In each of these
cases, there seems to be much diversity, or even
tension, in how FEP is said to be explanatory.
This diversity and tension, however, is by
design. Explanation is not a one-dimensional af-
fair; rather, a hypothesis, h, can be explanatory
in a number of different ways. This can be seen
by applying the overall Bayesian framework to
scientific explanation itself. The strength of the
case for h is consummate with how much of the
evidence,  e,  h can explain away. As we know
from the discussion of FEP, explaining away can
happen in diverse ways: by changing the accur-
acy, the precision, or the complexity of h, or by
intervening to obtain expected, high precision e.
As  discussed  for  FEP in  Hohwy (this collec-
tion), we can also consider h’s ability to explain
away  e over shorter or longer time scales: if  h
has much fine-grained detail it will be able to
explain away much of the short term variability
in e but may not be useful in the longer term,
whereas  a  more  abstract  h is  unable  to  deal
with fine-grained detail but can better accom-
modate longer prediction horizons.
Sometimes  these  diverse  aspects  of
Bayesian explaining-away pull in different direc-
tions.  For example,  an attempt at  unification
via de-complexifying h may come at the loss of
explaining some particular mechanistic instanti-
ations. Conversely, an overly complex h may be
overfitted and thereby explain away occurrent
particular detail extremely well but be at a loss
in terms of explaining many other parts of e.
In  constructing  a  scientific  explanation,
how should one balance these different aspects
of Bayesian explanation? Again we can appeal
to FEP itself for inspiration: a good explanation
minimizes  prediction  error  on  average  and  in
the  long  run.  That  is,  a  good  explanation
should not generate excessively large prediction
errors, and should be robust enough to persist
successfully for  a long time.  This  is  intuitive,
since we don’t trust explanations that tend to
generate  large  prediction  errors,  nor  explana-
tions  that  cease  to  apply  once  circumstances
change slightly.
Formulating the goal of scientific explana-
tion in this way immediately raises the question
of  what  it  means  for  prediction  error  to  be
“large” or for a hypothesis to survive a “long
time”.  The  answer  lies  in  expected  precisions
and context dependence. In building a theory,
the scientist also needs to build up expectations
for the precision (i.e., size) of prediction errors,
and for the spatiotemporal structure of the phe-
nomenon of interest. Not surprisingly, these as-
pects are also found in the conception of hier-
archical Bayesian inference. 
Achieving  this  balanced  goal  requires  a
golden-mean-type strategy: explanations should
not be excessively general nor excessively par-
ticular, given context and expectations. That is,
h should be able to explain away e in the long
term without generating excessive prediction er-
rors in the short term, as guided by expecta-
tions of precision and domain.
I  think  FEP is  useful  for  attaining  this
golden mean, and that this is what makes FEP
so attractive and promising. As a scientific hy-
pothesis, it does not prioritise one type of ex-
planatory aspect over another, but instead bal-
ances  explanatory  aspects  against  each  other
such that prediction error concerning the work-
ings of the mind is very satisfyingly minimized
on average and in the long run (and this indeed
is the message of The Predictive Mind). Rather
poetically,  in  my  view,  this  means  that  we
should evaluate FEP’s explanatory prowess by
applying it to itself.
7 Conclusion
I have agreed, to a large extent, with the points
Harkness makes in his commentary. I have how-
ever also  sought to suggest a more pluralistic
perspective  on scientific  explanation.  This  en-
sures that the free energy principle, as it applies
to the neural organ, has great potential to ex-
plain many aspects of the mind. I went one step
further,  however,  and  suggested  that  behind
this  explanatory  pluralism  lies  a  unified,
Bayesian  account  of  explanation,  which  per-
fectly mimics the unifying aspects of  the free
energy principle itself.
Hohwy, J. (2015). The Diversity of Bayesian Explanation - A Reply to Dominic L. Harkness.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 19(R). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570870 5 | 6
www.open-mind.net
References
Harvey, W. (1889).  On the motion of the heart and the
blood in animals. London, UK: George Bell & Sons. 
Hohwy, J. (2013). The predictive mind. Oxford, UK: Ox-
ford University Press. 
 (2015). The neural organ explains the mind. In T.
Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds.)  Open MIND. Frank-
furt a. M., GER: MIND Group. 
Hohwy, J. (2015). The Diversity of Bayesian Explanation - A Reply to Dominic L. Harkness.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 19(R). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570870 6 | 6
